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A regularized hidden Markov model for analyzing the
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Marius O¨tting∗, Andreas Groll†
Abstract
Although academic research on the “hot hand” effect (in particular, in sports,
especially in basketball) has been going on for more than 30 years, it still re-
mains a central question in different areas of research whether such an effect
exists. In this contribution, we investigate the potential occurrence of a “hot
shoe” effect for the performance of penalty takers in football based on data from
the German Bundesliga. For this purpose, we consider hidden Markov models
(HMMs) to model the (latent) forms of players. To further account for indi-
vidual heterogeneity of the penalty taker as well as the opponent’s goalkeeper,
player-specific abilities are incorporated in the model formulation together with
a LASSO penalty. Our results suggest states which can be tied to different forms
of players, thus providing evidence for the hot shoe effect, and shed some light
on exceptionally well-performing goalkeepers, which are of potential interest to
managers and sports fans.
1 Introduction
In sports, the performance of players is frequently discussed by fans and journalists. An
often discussed phenomenon in several sports is the “hot hand”, meaning that players
may enter a state where they experience extraordinary success. For example, the former
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German football player Gerd Mu¨ller potentially was in a “hot” state when scoring 11
penalties in a row between 1975 and 1976. However, with 3 penalties missed in a row
earlier in 1971, he potentially was in a “cold” state when taking these penalty kicks.
Academic research on the hot hand started by Gilovich et al. (1985). In their seminal
paper, they analyzed basketball free-throw data and provided no evidence for the hot
hand, arguing that people tend to belief in the hot hand due to memory bias. In the
past decade, however, some studies provided evidence for the hot hand while others
failed to find such an effect (see Bar-Eli et al., 2006, for a review). Hence, the existence
of a hot hand effect in different sports still remains an open question.
In our analysis, we investigate a potential “hot shoe” effect of penalty takers in
the German Bundesliga. Our data set comprises all taken penalties in the Bundesliga
from the first season (1963/64) until season 2016/17, totaling in n = 3, 482 observations.
Specifically, to explicitly account for the underlying (latent) form of a player, we consider
hidden Markov models (HMMs) to investigate a potential hot shoe effect. Using HMMs
to investigate the hot hand was first done by Albert (1993) for an analysis in baseball,
but also more recently by Green and Zwiebel (2018) who also analyze data from baseball
and by O¨tting et al. (2018) who analyse data from darts.
There are several potential confounding factors when analyzing the outcome of
penalty kicks, such as the score of the match and the abilities of the two involved
players, i.e. the penalty taker and the opposing team’s goal keeper. Accounting for
these factors leads to a large number of covariates, some of them also exhibiting a
noteworthy amount of correlation/multicollinearity, which makes model fitting and in-
terpretation of parameters difficult. Hence, sparser models are desirable. To tackle
these problems, variable selection is performed here by applying a LASSO penalization
approach (see Tibshirani, 1996). Our results suggest clear evidence for two different
states of penalty takers, which can be tied to a cold and a hot state. In addition, the
results shed some light on exceptionally well-performing goalkeepers.
The remainder of the manuscript is structured as follows. The data on penalty kicks
from the German Bundesliga is described in Section 2. In Section 3 the considered
methodology is presented, namely a LASSO penalization technique for HMMs. The
proposed approach is further investigated in a short simulation study in Section 4
and the results of our hot shoe analysis on German Bundesliga data are presented in
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Section 5. Finally, we discuss the results and conclude in Section 6.
2 Data
The considered data set comprises all taken penalty kicks in the German Bundesliga
from its first season 1963/1964 until the end of the season 2016/2017. Parts of the
data have already been used in Bornkamp et al. (2009). In the analysis, we include all
players who took at least 5 penalty kicks during the time period considered, resulting
in n = 3, 482 penalty kicks taken by 310 different players. For these penalty kicks
considered, 327 different goalkeepers were involved. The resulting variable of interest
is a binary variable indicating whether the player converted the penalty kick or not.
Hence, we consider binary time series {yp,t}t=1,...,Tp , with Tp denoting the total number
of penalties taken by player p, indicating whether player p scored the penalty at attempt
t, i.e.:
yp,t =
1, if the t–th penalty kick is converted;0, otherwise.
Since several other factors potentially affect the outcome of a penalty kick (such as the
score of the match), we consider further covariates. For the choice of covariates, we
follow Dohmen (2008), who analyzed the effect of pressure when taking penalty kicks
and, hence, accounts for different potential confounders. These additional covariates
include a dummy indicating whether the match was played at home, the matchday, the
minute where the penalty was taken, the experience of both the penalty taker and the
goalkeeper (quantified by the number of years the player played for a professional team)
and the categorized score difference, with categories more than 2 goals behind, 2 goals
behind, 1 goal behind, 1 goal ahead, 2 goals ahead or more than 2 goals ahead. Since
the effect of the score might depend on the minute of the match, we further include
interaction terms between the categories of the score difference and the minute. To
consider rule changes for penalty kicks (see Dohmen, 2008, for more details), we include
dummy variables for different time intervals (season 1985/86 and before, between season
1986/87 and season 1995/96, season 1996/1997, and from season 1997/1998 up to
3
season 2016/2017). Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics for all metric covariates
considered as well as for {yp,t}.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
successful penalty 0.780 0.414 0 1
matchday – – 1 38
home 0.316 0.465 0 1
experience (penalty taker) 6.323 3.793 0 19
experience (goalkeeper) 5.343 4.187 0 19
minute 51.92 24.91 1 90
Finally, to explicitly account for player-specific characteristics, we include intercepts
for all penalty takers as well as for all goalkeepers considered in our sample. These
parameters can be interpreted as the players penalty abilities (i.e., the penalty shooting
skill for the penalty taker and the (negative) penalty saving skill for the goalkeeper).
To illustrate the typical structure of our data, an example time series from our sample
of the famous German attacker Gerd Mu¨ller, who played in the Bundesliga for Bayern
Munich from 1964 until 1979, is shown in Figure 1. The corresponding part in the data
set is shown in Tables 2 and 3.
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Figure 1: Penalty history over time of the player Gerd Mu¨ller for the time period from
1964 until 1979; a successful penalty is shown in yellow, a failure in black.
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Table 2: Part of the data set corresponding to the metric covariates.
player
successful
penalty
matchday home
experience
(penalty taker)
experience
(goalkeeper)
minute · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
... · · ·
Gerd Mu¨ller 1 15 0 1 3 90 · · ·
Gerd Mu¨ller 1 25 0 1 3 81 · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
... · · ·
Gerd Mu¨ller 0 7 0 13 2 37 · · ·
Gerd Mu¨ller 0 8 1 13 8 68 · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
Table 3: Part of the data set corresponding to the player- and goalkeeper specific effects.
Hans
Mu¨ller
(player)
Gerd
Mu¨ller
(player)
Ludwig
Mu¨ller
(player)
· · ·
Gu¨nter
Bernard
(goalkeeper)
Wolfgang
Schnarr
(goalkeeper)
· · ·
Dieter
Burdenski
(goalkeeper)
Wolfgang
Kneib
(goalkeeper)
...
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... ...
0 1 0 · · · 0 1 · · · 0 0
0 1 0 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... ...
0 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 1
0 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 1 0
...
...
... · · · ... ... · · · ... . . .
3 Methods
Figure 1 indicates that there are phases in the career of Gerd Mu¨ller where he scored
several penalty kicks in a row, e.g. between 1975 and 1976 as already mentioned in
the introduction. At some parts of his career, however, successful penalty kicks were
occasionally followed by one or more missed penalty kicks. To explicitly account for
such phases we consider HMMs, where the latent state process can be interpreted as
the underlying varying form of a player. Moreover, Stone (2012) argues that HMMs are
more suitable for analyzing the hot hand than analyzing serial correlation of outcomes,
since the latter mentioned outcomes are only noisy measures of the underlying (latent)
form of a player.
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3.1 Hidden Markov models
In HMMs, the observations yp,t are assumed to be driven by an underlying state process
sp,t, in a sense that the yp,t are generated by one of N distributions according to the
Markov chain. In our application, the state process sp,t serves for the underlying varying
form of a player. For notational simplicity, we drop the player-specific subscript p in
the following. Switching between the states is taken into account by the transition
probability matrix (t.p.m.) Γ = (γij), with γij = Pr(st = j|st−1 = i), i, j = 1, . . . , N .
We further allow for additional covariates at time t, xt = (x1t, . . . , xKt)
′, each of which
assumed to have the same effect in each state, whereas the intercept is assumed to vary
across the states, leading to the following linear state-dependent predictor:
η(st) = β
(st)
0 + β1x1t + . . .+ βkxKt.
In fact, this is a simple Markov-switching regression model, where only the intercept
varies across the states (see, e.g., Goldfeld and Quandt, 1973). The dependence struc-
ture of the HMM considered is shown in Figure 2.
st−1... st st+1 ...
yt−1 yt yt+1
xt+1xtxt−1
Figure 2: Graphical structure of the HMM considered. Each observation yt is assumed
to be generated by one of N distributions according to the state process st, which serves
for the underlying form of a player. In addition, covariates xt are assumed to affect yt.
For our response variable yt, indicating whether the penalty attempt t was successful
or not, we assume yt ∼ Bern(pit) and link pit to our state-dependent linear predictor ηt
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using the logit link function, i.e. logit(pit) = η
(st). Defining an N ×N diagonal matrix
P (yt) with i–th diagonal element equal to Pr(yt|st = i) and assuming that the initial
distribution δ of a player is equal to the stationary distribution, i.e. the solution to
Γδ = δ, the likelihood for a single player p is given by
Lp(α) = δP(yp1)ΓP(yp2) . . .ΓP(ypTp)1 ,
with column vector 1 = (1, . . . , 1)′ ∈ RN (see Zucchini et al., 2016) and parameter
vector α = (γ11, γ12, . . . , γ1N , . . . , γNN , β
(1)
0 , . . . , β
(N)
0 , β1, . . . , βk)
′ collecting all unknown
parameters. Specifically, formulating the likelihood as above amounts to running the
forward algorithm, which allows to calculate the likelihood recursively at computational
cost O(TN2) only, thus rendering numerical maximization of the likelihood feasible
(Zucchini et al., 2016). To obtain the full likelihood for all 310 players considered
in the sample, we assume independence between the individual players such that the
likelihood is calculated by the product of the individual likelihoods of the players:
L(α) =
310∏
p=1
Lp(α) =
310∏
p=1
δP(yp1)ΓP(yp2) . . .ΓP(ypTp)1.
For our analysis of a potential hot shoe effect, we initially select N = 2 states, which
potentially are aligned to a “hot” and a “cold” state, i.e. states with superior and
poor performance, respectively. The parameter vector α, hence, reduces to α =
(γ11, γ12, γ21, γ22, β
(1)
0 , β
(2)
0 , β1, . . . , βk)
′. The choice of N will be further discussed in
Chapter 5.
Parameter estimation is done by maximizing the likelihood numerically using nlm()
in R (R Core Team, 2018). However, if we consider all covariates introduced in our
model formulation from Section 2, the model gets rather complex, is hard to interpret
and multicollinearity issues might occur. Hence, we propose to employ a penalized
likelihood approach based on a LASSO penalty, which is described in the next section.
3.2 Variable selection by the LASSO
In order to obtain a sparse and interpretable model, the estimation of the covariate
effects will be performed by a regularized estimation approach. The idea is to first set
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up a model with a rather large number of possibly influential variables (in particular,
with regard to the player-specific ability parameters) and then to regularize the effect
of the single covariates. This way, the variance of the parameter estimates is diminished
and, hence, usually lower prediction error is achieved than with the unregularized max-
imum likelihood (ML) estimator. The basic concept of regularization is to maximize a
penalized version of the likelihood `(α) = log (L(α)). More precisely, one maximizes
the penalized log-likelihood
`pen(α) = log (L(α))− λ
K∑
k=1
|βk| , (1)
where λ represents a tuning parameter, which controls the strength of the penalization.
The optimal value for this tuning parameter has to be chosen either by cross-validation
or suitable model selection criteria. The latter usually constitute a compromise be-
tween the model fit (e.g., in terms of the likelihood) and the complexity of the model.
Frequently used are the Akaike information criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1973) or Bayesian
information criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978). In the context of LASSO, the effective
degrees of freedom for the AIC and BIC are estimated as the number of non-zero coef-
ficients (see Zou et al., 2007). Since our longitudinal data structure with multiple short
time series from 310 individuals renders cross-validation rather difficult, we select the
tuning parameter λ in the following by information criteria.
Note that in contrast to the ridge penalty, which penalizes the squared coefficients
and shrinks them towards zero (see Hoerl and Kennard, 1970), the LASSO penalty
on the absolute values of the coefficients, first proposed by Tibshirani (1996), can set
coefficients to exactly zero and, hence, enforces variable selection.
Another advantage of the employed penalization is the way correlated predictors
are treated. For example, if two (or more) predictors are highly correlated, parameter
estimates are stabilized by the penalization. In such scenarios, the LASSO penalty tends
to include only one of the predictors and only includes a second predictor if it entails
additional information for the response variable. Therefore, if several variables possibly
contain information on the outcome of the penalty, they can be used simultaneously.
To fully incorporate the LASSO penalty in our setting, the non-differentiable L1
norm |βk| in Eq. (1) is approximated as suggested by Oelker and Tutz (2017). Specifi-
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cally, the L1 norm is approximated by
√
(βk + c)2, where c is a small positive number
(say c = 10−5). With the approximation of the penalty, the corresponding likelihood is
still maximized numerically using nlm() in R as denoted above.
In the simulation study from the subsequent section, we also investigate a relaxed
LASSO-type version of our fitting scheme. The relaxed LASSO (Meinshausen, 2007)
is known to often produce sparser models with equal or lower prediction loss than the
regular LASSO. To be more precise, for each value of the tuning parameter λ, in a final
step we fit an (unregularized) model that includes only the variables corresponding to
the non-zero parameters of the preceding LASSO estimates.
4 A short simulation study
We consider a simulation scenario similar to our real-data application, with a Bernoulli-
distributed response variable, an underlying 2-state Markov chain and 50 covariates, 47
of which being noise covariates:
yt ∼ Bern(pi(st)),
with
logit(pi(st)) = η(st) = β
(st)
0 + 0.5 · x1t + 0.7 · x2t − 0.8 · x3t +
47∑
j=4
0 · xjt .
We further set β
(1)
0 = logit
−1(0.75), β(2)0 = logit
−1(0.35) and
Γ =
(
0.9 0.1
0.1 0.9
)
.
The covariate values were drawn independently from a uniform distribution within the
interval [−2, 2]. The interval boundaries as well as the corresponding effects β1, β2
and β3 were chosen such that reasonable values for the response are obtained (i.e.,
moderate proportions of ones and zeros). We conduct 100 simulation runs, in each run
generating T = 5100 observations yt, t = 1, . . . , 5100, from the model specified above,
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with the sample size being about the same size as for the real data application. Out
of these 5100 simulated observations, the first 5000 are used for model fitting, whereas
for the last 100 observations (which are denoted by ytestt ), the predictive performance
of several different models is compared (see below).
For the choice of the tuning parameter λ, we consider a (logarithmic) grid of length
50, Λ = {5000, . . . , 0.0001}. To compare the performance of the above described
LASSO-type estimation, we consider the following five fitting schemes:
• HMM without penalization (i.e., with λ = 0)
• LASSO-HMM with λ selected by AIC
• LASSO-HMM with λ selected by BIC
• relaxed-LASSO-HMM with λ selected by AIC
• relaxed-LASSO-HMM with λ selected by BIC
For all five methods considered, we calculate the mean squared error (MSE) of the
coefficients β1, . . . , β50:
MSEβ =
1
50
50∑
k=1
(βˆk − βk)2.
We also calculate the MSE for the state-dependent intercepts β
(1)
0 and β
(2)
0 , and for the
entries of the t.p.m., γ11 and γ22, which is done analogously to the MSE for β1, . . . , β50
shown above. To further compare the predictive performance of the fitting schemes
considered, we predict the distribution for each of the 100 out-of-sample observations,
i.e. the success probabilities pˆipredt , and compare these to the 100 remaining simulated
observations ytestt . For that purpose, we calculate the Brier score and the average
predicted probability, which are given as follows:
B =
1
100
100∑
t=1
(pˆipredt − ytestt )2
A =
1
100
100∑
t=1
(
pˆipredt 1{ytestt =1} + (1− pˆipredt )1{ytestt =0}
)
,
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with 1{.} denoting the indicator function. For the Brier score B, more accurate predic-
tions correspond to lower values, with the lowest possible value being 0. For the average
predicted probability A, higher values correspond to more precise predictions. In ad-
dition, the average predicted probability can be directly interpreted as the probability
for a correct prediction.
The boxplots showing the MSEs over the 100 simulation runs, and the boxplots
showing the Brier score and the average predicted probability for the predictive perfor-
mance, are shown in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. In both figures, the HMM without
penalization is denoted by “MLE”, the LASSO-HMM with λ selected by AIC and BIC
are denoted by “AIC” and “BIC”, respectively, and the relaxed-LASSO-HMM with λ
selected by AIC and BIC are denoted by “AIC relaxed” and “BIC relaxed”, respec-
tively. For the state-dependent intercepts β
(1)
0 and β
(2)
0 , we see that the median MSE
for the models with λ chosen by the BIC is fairly high compared to all other models
considered. A similar behaviour is observed for the entries of the t.p.m., γ11 and γ22.
The middle row in Figure 3 shows the MSE for β1, . . . β50 as well as the corresponding
true and false positive rates (denoted by TPR and FPR, respectively). The simulation
results indicate that the non-noise covariates are detected by all models, whereas espe-
cially the LASSO-HMM with λ selected by the AIC detects several noise covariates. A
fairly low number of noise coefficients is selected by the relaxed-LASSO-HMM fitting
scheme with λ selected by the AIC and by the LASSO-HMM with λ selected by the the
BIC. The corresponding medians for the FPR are 0.149 and 0.170, respectively. The
most promising results are given by the relaxed-LASSO-HMM with λ chosen by the
BIC. In 84 out of 100 simulations, no noise covariates were selected by this model.
The left plot in the middle row of Figure 3 shows that the median MSE of the
coefficients βj for the LASSO-HMM with λ selected by the BIC is higher than the
median MSE of all other models considered. This arises since the BIC tends to select
a rather high λ, which can be seen from the median MSE separated for the noise and
non-noise coefficients (last row of Figure 3). With the fairly high λ chosen by the BIC,
i.e. with more shrinkage involved, the MSE for the non-noise coefficients is rather large.
At the same time, since only a few covariates are selected with a rather high λ, the
MSE for the noise coefficients is very low.
For the predictive performance of the methods considered, we see that visually there
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is no clear difference in the Brier score between the models, which is shown in the top
panel of Figure 4. The result for the average predicted probability – shown in the
bottom panel of Figure 4 – confirm that the LASSO-HMM with λ chosen by the BIC
and the HMM without penalization perform worse than the other models considered.
The results of the simulation study are very encouraging, with the LASSO penalty
allowing for variable selection. The performance in terms of MSE, TPR and FPR
suggest that the LASSO-HMM with λ selected by the BIC performs worst, with the
MSE being higher than for the HMM without penalization. However, the LASSO-
HMM with λ selected by the AIC as well as the relaxed-LASSO-HMM with λ selected
by AIC and BIC, respectively, (partly substantially) outperform the HMM without
penalization in terms of MSE. The relaxed-LASSO-HMM with λ selected by the BIC
performs best in terms of MSE, TPR, FPR and the predictive performance. Finally, in
all simulation runs the overall pattern was captured with regard to the true underlying
state-dependent intercepts β
(1)
0 , β
(2)
0 and diagonal entries of the t.p.m., i.e. γ11 and
γ22. Fitting the LASSO-HMM and the relaxed-LASSO-HMM on the grid containing
50 different tuning parameters λ took on average 47 minutes using a 3.4 GHz Intel c©
CoreTM i7 CPU. This is remarkably fast, considering that both the LASSO-HMM and
the relaxed-LASSO-HMM are fitted to the data for each value of λ, leading to 100 fitted
models in total.
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Figure 3: Boxplots of the MSE, TPR and FPR obtained in 100 simulation runs. “AIC”
and “BIC” denote the LASSO-HMM fitting scheme with λ chosen by AIC and BIC,
respectively. “AIC relaxed” and “BIC relaxed” denote the relaxed-LASSO-HMM fitting
scheme with λ chosen by AIC and BIC, respectively. “MLE” denots the HMM without
penalization.
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HMM fitting scheme with λ chosen by AIC and BIC, respectively. “AIC relaxed” and
“BIC relaxed” denote the relaxed-LASSO-HMM fitting scheme with λ chosen by AIC
and BIC, respectively. “MLE” denots the HMM without penalization.
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5 Results
We now apply our LASSO-HMM approach to the German Bundesliga penalty data.
For the analysis of a potential hot shoe effect, we include all covariates from Section 2
into the predictor and chose N = 2 for the number of states, which can be interpreted
as hot and cold states, respectively.1 This yields the following linear state-dependent
predictor2:
logit(pi(st)) = β
(st)
0 + β1homet + β2minutet +. . .+ β100GerdMuellert +. . .+ β656WolfgangKneibt .
Since the simulation study above indicates that the unpenalized maximum likelihood
estimator is not appropriate for such a large number of covariates, we only consider
the LASSO-type fitting schemes for the real data application. Specifically, since the
relaxed-LASSO-HMM with λ selected by the BIC showed the most promising results
in the simulation, we focus on the results obtained by this fitting scheme, but we also
present the results obtained by the two LASSO-HMM fitting schemes3. The parameter
estimates obtained (on the logit scale) indicate that the baseline level for scoring a
penalty is higher in the model’s state 1 than in state 2 (βˆ
(1)
0 = 1.422 > βˆ
(2)
0 = −14.50),
thus indicating evidence for a hot shoe effect. State 1, hence, can be interpreted as a
hot state, whereas state 2 refers to a cold state. In addition, with the t.p.m. estimated
as
Γˆ =
(
0.978 0.022
0.680 0.320
)
,
there is high persistence in state 1, i.e. in the hot state, whereas the cold state 2 is a
transient state, where switching to state 1 is most likely. The stationary distribution as
1A psychological reason for being hot or cold may be a higher/lower level of self confidence.
2Throughout this paper, all metric covariates are considered as linear. Since the main interest of
this contribution is to investigate the LASSO penalty in HMMs, future research on the hot shoe could
focus also on non-linear effects, for example for the matchday and the minute.
3The relaxed-LASSO-HMM with optimal λ selected by the AIC yielded a rather unreasonable
model, where almost all of the more than 600 covariates were selected and with partly unrealistically
large corresponding estimated covariate effects, indicating some tendency of overfitting. For this reason,
we excluded this model from the analysis.
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implied by the estimated t.p.m. is δˆ = (0.969, 0.031), i.e., according to the fitted model,
players are in about 96.9% of the time in the hot state and in about 3.1% in the cold
state. The diagonal elements of the t.p.m. for the other fitting schemes are obtained as
γˆ11,AIC = 0.989, γˆ22,AIC = 0.386 and γˆ11,BIC = 0.987, γˆ22,BIC = 0.368, respectively. The
corresponding state-dependent intercepts are obtained as βˆ
(1)
0,AIC = −14.71, βˆ(2)0,AIC =
1.347 and βˆ
(1)
0,BIC = −18.83, βˆ(2)0,BIC = 1.360, respectively. These results further confirm
evidence for a hot shoe effect.
For the grid of potential tuning parameters λ, Figure 6 shows the progress of the
AIC and BIC for the LASSO-HMM, indicating that the AIC selects a lower tuning
parameter than the BIC. The corresponding coefficient paths of the LASSO-HMM
approach together with the associated optimal tuning parameters selected by the AIC
and BIC, respectively, are shown in Figure 5.4 No covariates are selected by the LASSO-
HMM with λ selected by the BIC, whereas Jean-Marie Pfaff, a former goalkeeper of
Bayern Munich, is selected by the LASSO-HMM with λ selected by the AIC and by
the relaxed-LASSO-HMM model based on BIC. The negative coefficient implies that
the odds for scoring a penalty decrease if Jean-Marie Pfaff is the goalkeeper of the
opponent’s team. The coefficient is substantially larger in magnitude for the relaxed-
LASSO model, since for this fitting schemes the model is re-fitted with λ = 0 on the set
of selected coefficients from the first model fit (see above). An overview of the selected
effects is given in Table 4.
Table 4: Overview of selected players and goalkeepers by all models considered.
BIC AIC
BIC
relaxed
Jean-Marie Pfaff (goalkeeper) 0.000 -0.001 -0.125
Rudolf Kargus (goalkeeper) 0.000 0.000 0.000
...
...
...
...
Manuel Neuer (goalkeeper) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lothar Mattha¨us (player) 0.000 0.000 0.000
...
...
...
...
Nuri Sahin (player) 0.000 0.000 0.000
4We abstain from showing the coefficient paths plot for the relaxed LASSO-HMM model, because
due to the unpenalized re-fit the paths look rather irregular.
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Figure 5: Coefficient paths of all covariates considered in the LASSO-HMM models.
The dashed lines indicate the optimal penalty parameters λ selected by AIC and BIC,
respectively. For the λ selected by the BIC, no covariates are selected, whereas for the
AIC one covariate is selected (see also Table 4).
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Figure 6: Paths of AIC and BIC in the LASSO-HMM models. The vertical lines indicate
the optimal penalty parameters λ selected by AIC and BIC, respectively.
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6 Discussion
The modelling framework developed in this contribution, a LASSO-HMM and a relaxed-
LASSO-HMM, respectively, allows for implicit variable selection in the state-dependent
process of HMMs. The performance of the variable selection is first investigated in a
simulation study, indicating that the relaxed-LASSO-HMM with the corresponding
tuning parameter selected by the BIC is the best-performing fitting scheme considered.
For the analysis of a hot shoe effect, we fit both LASSO-HMMs and relaxed-LASSO-
HMMs to data on penalty kicks in the German Bundesliga. Factors potentially affecting
the performance of penalty-takers, such as the current score of the match, are included
in the predictors. In addition, dummy variables for the penalty-takers as well as for
the goalkeepers are included. The results indicate evidence for a hot shoe effect. In
addition, our results also shed some light on exceptionally performing players such as
Jean-Marie Pfaff, a former goalkeeper of Bayern Munich, who has been selected by
several of the considered fitting schemes.
A clear limitation of the real data application considered is the problem of self
selection. Since the manager (or the team) can decide which player has to take the
penalty, players who have been rather unsuccessful in the past may not take penalty
kicks anymore. However, several teams have demonstrated in the past that they rely on
and trust in a certain player for taking penalty kicks, regardless of the outcome of the
kick. Whereas penalty kicks in football yield to a time series due to the way in which
penalties take place, the corresponding time intervals between actions are irregular.
Although our data cover all attempts in the German Bundesliga, there are sometimes
several month between two attempts. Moreover, some players might be involved in
penalty kicks in matches from other competitions such as the UEFA Champions League,
the UEFA European Cup or in matches with their national teams. These could also
affect, whether a player is currently in a hot or cold state. From this perspective, the
time series of Bundesliga penalties could be considered as partly incomplete for some
players.
From a methodological point, the number of states selected (i.e., N = 2) may be too
coarse for modelling the underlying form of a player. Considering a continuously vary-
ing underlying state variable instead may be more realistic, since gradual changes in a
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player’s form could then be captured. This could be achieved by considering state-space
models, where regularized estimation approaches are a first point for further research.
The motivation in this contribution for N = 2 states, however, was to approximate
the potential psychological states in a simple manner for ease of interpretation, e.g.,
in the sense of hot (“player is confident”) or cold (“player is nervous”) states. More-
over, our main focus was to show the usefulness of our method developed in a rather
simple/intuitive setting with two states. In addition, future research could focus on
regularization in HMMs where not only the intercept (as considered here), but also the
parameters βj are allowed to depend on the current state. Regularization in this model
formulation could be taken into account by applying so-called fused LASSO techniques
(see, e.g., Gertheiss and Tutz, 2010), where the parameters could either be shrunk to
zero or to the same size for all states considered. For the former, a single tuning pa-
rameter for each state has to be introduced, which brings the need for efficient tuning
strategies.
The modeling framework developed here can easily be tailored to other applications,
where implicit variable selection in HMMs is desired. For the application considered
in this contribution, i.e. an analysis of a potential hot hand/hot shoe effect, other
sports such as basketball or hockey could be analyzed. Potential covariates — whose
corresponding effects are penalized — in these sports cover the shot type, shot origin,
and game score, to name but a few.
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